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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
-vs- Case No. 16025 
CHARLES ERWIN ALEXANDER, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
Appellant was charged with aggravated sexual assault 
in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-405(1) (a) (ii) (1953, 
as amended) . 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
Appellant was tried to the Court, the Honorable 
Allen B. Sorensen presiding and was found guilty of the 
crime charged. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Respondent seeks affirmance of the guilty verdict. 
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STATEMENT OJ' THE FACTS 
On the afternoon of October 17, 1977, appellant 
and a co-defendant, Luther Lee Cook, drove a furniture van 
in front of Union High School and forced a young woman waiting 
at the school to enter the van. (Tr. 12, 13 49, 50). 
Appellant was driving the van and proceeded toward Vernal. 
Cook warned the girl that if she said anything, he and 
appellant would use a knife which appellant was holding in 
his hand (Tr. 14, 15). While driving, Cook put his arm 
around the girl and appellant told Cook that he would kill 
him if he didn't leave the girl alone. Cook complied (Tr. 45). 
The van eventually turned off onto a dirt road 
fourteen to sixteen miles outside of Roosevelt where it 
became high-centered (Tr. 16-17). 
Appellant, Cook, and the girl left the van and the 
girl attempted to escape (Tr. 18). Cook chased her, 
threatened her with a knife and put her in the back of the 
van (Tr. 18). While in the back of the van, the girl heard 
Cook threaten appellant (Tr. 18-19), although Cook denied 
making the threat. 
Eventually Cook entered the back of the van and 
told the girl to undress (Tr. 21-22). She finally agreed 
after Cook again threatened her with the knife (Tr. 22). 
-2-
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Cook began raping the girl and appellant entered 
the van from the front. He watched briefly and when the 
girl continued to struggle, appellant put a screwdriver to 
her side, scratched her with it, and told her to stop 
fighting and to "move." (Tr. 22, 23). The victim couldn't 
remember everything that happened, but it is possible that 
appellant then attempted to rape her (Tr. 56). 
Appellant and Cook left the back of the van and 
attempted to free it (Tr. 24). While appellant and Cook 
were digging under the van, appellant became ill, apparently 
because of a hypoglycemic reaction and a peptic ulcer 
(Tr. 24, 103, 106). 
While appellant and the victim were digging out 
the van, Cook disappeared (Tr. 24). The victim asked 
appellant to let her go and he finally relented and allowed 
her to leave (Tr. 24-25). 
Appellant's theory of the case was that Cook 
threatened him and forced him to aid in the rape (Tr. 10). 
Appellant's testimony, how·ever, established that he 
was bigger than Cook (Tr. 95), and other testimony indicated 
that appellant likewise threatened Cook (Tr. 45). 
The trial court, acting as the finder of fact, 
concluded that appellant aided and abetted in the commission 
of the aggravated sexual assault and found him guilty. 
-3-
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Appellant now appeals claiming the Court did 
not give sufficient weight to his theory of the case. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
THE TRIAL COURT'S DECISION IS 
CORRECT AND APPELLANT DID NOT 
ACT UNDER COERCION OR THREAT 
OF IMMINENT HARM. 
Appellant contends that he was forced by Cook to 
assist in Cook's rape of the victim and is therefore not 
guilty. Appellant bases this argument on Utah Code Ann. 
§ 76-2-302 (1953, as amended), which states (inter alia): 
(1) A person is not guilty of an 
offense when he engaged in the proscribed 
conduct because he was coerced to do so 
by the use or threatened imminent use of 
unlawful physical force upon him or a 
third ,person, which force or threatened 
force a person of reasonable firmness in 
his situation would not have resisted. 
(2) The defense of compulsion 
provided by this section shall be 
unavailable to a person who intentionally, 
knowingly, or recklessly places himself 
in a situation in which it is probable 
that he will be subjected to duress. 
Appellant suggests that subsection (1) above 
posits a subjective test and therefore, because of his 
apparent illness, his conduct was reasonable and not 
culpable. 
This contention is unsupported by the clear 
language of the statute and the facts of this case and case 
law. 
-4-
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First, subsection {1) establishes an objective 
test rather than a subjective one. Naturally, the conduct 
of the accused will be viewed under the circumstances as 
they existed. However, the accused's conduct must conform 
to that of "a person of reasonable firmness" under these 
circumstances. 
Any other construction of subsection (1) makes the 
above-quoted phrase meaningless, contrary to the standard 
rule of statutory construction which assumes legislative 
purpose and meaning for every word in a statute. 
Therefore, appellant's conduct must be measured 
against that of a person of reasonable firmness. This 
construction is supported by a New Mexico case, Esquibel v. 
State, 91 N.M. 498, 576 P.2d 1129 (1978). The Esquibel 
Court was asked to construe New Mexico's Duress instruction, 
N.M. U.J.I. Crim. 41.20, which states: 
Evidence has been presented that 
the defendant was forced to 
under threats. If the defendant feared 
immediate great bodily harm to himself 
or another person if he did not commit 
the crime and if a reasonable person 
would have acted in the same way under 
the circumstances, you must find the 
defendant not guilty. The burden is 
on the State to prove beyond a reasonable 
doubt that the defendant did not act 
under such reasonable fear. 
-5-
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The New Mexico Supreme Court found that: 
Duress and coercion are defenses 
to a criminal charge, if the accused 
feared immediate great bodily harm 
to himself or another person if he 
did not commit the crime charged and if 
a reasonable person would have acted 
the same way under the circumstances. 
State v. LeMarr, supra; State v. Lee, 
78 N.M. 421, 432 P.2d 265 (Ct.App. 1967), 
N.M. U.J.I, Crim. 41.20; Annot., 69 
A.L.R. 3d 678 at 684 (1976). 
(Emphasis in original). 
The questions to be asked under this standard are: 
I 
(1) was appellant coerced or threatened with the imminent 
use of physical force upon himself or the victim to compel his 
aid in committing the crimes, and (2) would a person of 
reasonable firmness have resisted the threats? 
The facts of the case indicate that appellant 
failed both parts of the test. The testimony suggests that 
Cook may have verbally threatened appellant several 
minutes before the rape (Tr. 18-19, 59). However, Cook was 
smaller than appellant (Tr. 95), and had altered his 
behavior earlier because of a threat by appellant (Tr. 45). 
Cook entered the back of the van before appellant, 
during which time appellant could have secured a weapon, 
escaped, or summoned help. Appellant entered the truck 
without coercion and threatened the victim without inducement 
from Cook (Tr. 22-23). 
-6-
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It should be noted that there is a fundamental 
difference between Cook's threats to the victim during the 
rape which established the prima facie case and his conduct 
toward appellant which purportedly activates the compulsion 
defense. The rape was accomplished because of an imminent 
threat of violence to the victim (Tr. 21-23). However, 
appellant's aiding and abetting was not the result of threats 
to the victim or himself, and is not justified by threats 
used to accomplish the rape. 
Appellant argues that his hypoglycemia and ulcer 
diminished his ability to resist. The testimony, however, 
established that appellant did not become ill until after 
the rape (Tr. 24). The medical testimony did not show or 
even suggest any dimination in willpower pr courage 
because of hypoglycemia or peptic ulcer. Appellant was not 
threatened during the course of the rape and the evidence 
shows that during the rape Cook was not holding a weapon 
(Tr. 35-36). 
Cases from other jurisdictions dealing with the 
defense of compulsion or duress posit that the threat must 
be of imminent and present violence. Threats of some future 
violence or injury are insufficient to invoke the defense. 
State v. Milum, 516 P.2d 984 (Kan. 1973); People v. LaCicero, 
459 P.2d 241 (Calif. 1969). The facts here do not satisfy 
the requirements of immediacy established by case law. 
-7- _.....oil 
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Respondent asserts that a person of reasonable 
firmness under the circumstances presented by the evidence 
would have resisted the compulsion to aid in the commission 
of the rape. Indeed, under the circumstances here it 
appears that appellant could have prevented the rape by 
exercising reasonable resistance and yet made no effort to 
do so. 
The second part of § 76-2-302 is also fatal to 
appellant's position. Subsection (2) quoted supra states: 
(2) The defense of compulsion 
provided by this section shall be 
unavailable to a person who in-
tentionally, knowingly, or recklessly 
places himself in a situation in which 
it is probable that he will be subjected 
to duress. 
The evidence indicates that appellant was aware of 
Cook's criminal intentions long before the crime occurred 
(Tr. 51-54). After appellant and Cook forced the victim 
into the truck, it was apparent that appellant sensed what was 
going to occur. A reasonable person in appellant's 
situation should have surmised Cook's intentions a considerablE 
time before the crime. 
Under subsection (2), therefore, appellant 
intentionally and kno~ingly placed himself in a situation 
in which it was probable that a crime would occur and 
probable that he would be subjected to duress to aid in the 
commission of a crime. 
-8-
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Two recent Federal Circuit Court cases indicate 
that where a defendant has opportunity to avoid the 
situation in which compulsion will occur, the defense cannot 
be asserted. United States v. Seattle, 585 F.2d 307 (8th 
Cir., 1978); United States v. Atencio, 586 F.2d 744 (9th 
Cir., 1978). In the present case, even assuming that the 
alleged threats here were authentic and compelling, appellant 
had many opportunities to avoid the situation. He could 
have refused to go with Cook to look for girls. No 
testimony was offered that he considered this option. He 
could have driven away when Cook initially confronted the 
victim, yet no testimony was offered that he considered 
this alternative. Even after the victim was in the van, 
appellant could have taken another route or helped her 
escape. Appellant did not pursue either opportunity. Thus, 
appellant had several chances to totally avoid the situation 
in which he was allegedly forced to aid in the rape and yet 
willingly continued his involvement. All of these factors 
preclude appellant from asserting the compulsion defense. 
Appellant proposes that Chacon v. People, 488 P.2d 
56 (Colo. 1971), dealing with self-defense and apparent 
necessity should apply to this case. Such a proposal is 
without merit. 
-9-
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First, the Utah compulsion statute establishes 
a requirement of imminent force. The "appearance of real 
danger" theory suggested in Chacon, supra, is inconsistent 
with the existence of imminent force. Respondent concedes 
that apparent necessity may be sufficiently compelling when 
a person is defending himself, but submits that a higher 
standard of necessity is needed when the circumstances 
require not only self-protection, but also affirmative 
assistance in committing a known felony unrelated to the 
act of self-defense. Respondent suggests that one who 
asserts the compulsion defense must do everything reasonably 
possible to test the authenticity of a threat of imminent 
force before aiding in the commission of a felony. Appellant 
here did nothing to determine whether Cook was actually 
willing to fulfil his alleged threat and did nothing to 
dissuade Cook from raping the victim. 
CONCLUSION 
Appellant has failed to meet the requirements 
of the compulsion statute, Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-302. There 
was no showing of threatened imminent use of unlawful 
physical force to compell assistance to the commission of 
the rape. The force or threat of forced used to accomplish 
the rape does not satisfy the requirement of compulsion to 
assist in the rape. Appellant did not act as a person of 
-10-
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reasonable firmness would have acted under the circumstances. 
The test for determining reasonable firmness is objective, 
not subjective. Appellant's illness wasnotshown to 
diminish his will power, courage, resistance, or thinking. 
Under the circumstances of the crime and statutes 
and case law dealing with compulsion, appellant's defense 
must fail. The Court, acting as trier of fact, properly 
found that appellant aided and abetted in the commission of 
a rape and that conviction should be affirmed by this Court. 
Respectfully submitted, 
ROBERT B. HANSEN 
Attorney General 
EARL F. DORIUS 
Assistant Attorney General 
Attorneys for Respondent 
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